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The standard view of U.S. technological history is that the locus of invention shifted during the early
twentieth century to large firms whose in-house research laboratories were superior sites for advancing
the complex technologies of the second industrial revolution.  In recent years this view has been subject
to increasing criticism.  At the same time, new research on equity markets during the early twentieth
century suggests that smaller, more entrepreneurial enterprises were finding it easier to gain financial
backing for technological discovery.  We use data on the assignment (sale or transfer) of patents to
explore the extent to which, and how, inventive activity was reorganized during this period.  We find
that two alternative modes of technological discovery developed in parallel during the early twentieth
century.  The first, concentrated in the Middle Atlantic region, centered on large firms with in-house
R&D labs and superior access to the region’s rapidly growing equity markets.  The other, located mainly
in the East North Central region, consisted of smaller, more entrepreneurial enterprises that drew primarily
on local sources of funds.  Both modes seem to have made roughly equivalent contributions to technological
change through the 1920s. The subsequent dominance of large firms seems to have been propelled
by a differential access to capital during the Great Depression that was subsequently reinforced by
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According to the standard view of U.S. technological history, inventive activity 
was reorganized during the early twentieth century.  Individuals had dominated the 
process of technological discovery during the preceding century, an era that the great 
historian Thomas Hughes has dubbed the golden age of the independent inventor 
(Hughes 1989).  As the economy shifted from the mechanical technologies of the first 
industrial revolution to the science-based technologies of the second, however, the capital 
requirements (both human and physical) for successful invention soared.  Large firms 
were better able to muster the resources needed to develop new technologies, and the in-
house research laboratories they built after the turn of the century enabled them, in the 
words of Joseph Schumpeter (1942), so completely to routinize the process of innovation 
that advances were realized “as a matter of course.” Although individual inventors never 
completely disappeared, they came to play a secondary role in technological change, as 
did the small entrepreneurial enterprises with which they were often associated. 
There is, however, another literature that has very different implications for our 
understanding of trends in the location of innovative activity.  This literature focuses on 
capital markets and portrays the early twentieth century as a period when more and more 
Americans were investing their savings in equities and, as a result, a broader range of 
companies could raise capital from the general public (see, for example, O’Sullivan 
2007).  The implication of this scholarship is that improved access to finance made it 
possible for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to continue to make important 3 
 
contributions to technological discovery, even as the capital requirements for effective 
invention rose. 
Until recently the technological history of the twentieth century has been written 
as if this second literature did not exist—as if the only story was the shift toward large-
firm R&D.  The tide is now turning, and there are a growing number of studies 
questioning both the advantages of large firms’ in-house research laboratories and 
whether the labs were ever really the dominant source of new technological discoveries.  
Thus far, however, the evidence offered in support of this revisionist view has been 
mainly anecdotal.  The purpose of this article is to bring systematic evidence to bear on 
these questions, using data on the assignment (that is, sale or transfer) of patents. 
In the next section of the paper we review the literature on the rise of large-firm 
R&D, as well as recent studies that have led to a reassessment of the value of in-house 
research labs.  We then survey the literature on equity markets and discuss its 
implications for understanding the reorganization of technological change during the 
early twentieth century.  After a brief section describing our data sources, we move on to 
an investigation of whether the patterns in the assignment data are consistent with the 
view that large firms increasingly dominated the process of technological discovery.  We 
find that large firms with industrial research labs obtained a rising share of patents during 
this period but that so did small entrepreneurial enterprises. Indeed, these two alternative 
modes of organizing technological discovery seem to have developed in parallel in 
different regions of the country.  Large firms accounted for the lion’s share of the 
inventions in the Middle Atlantic, though our evidence raises doubts about whether their 
ascendancy (at least during this period) owed much to their R&D labs.  By contrast, in 4 
 
the East North Central region smaller, more entrepreneurial enterprises predominated.  
To the extent that these latter firms benefited from the growth of financial markets, the 
relevant institutions seem to have been regional exchanges that drew primarily on local 
sources of capital. Although large firms would later come to dominate technological 
discovery, the change seems to have been more a function of the Great Depression and 
government policy than of the inherent superiority of in-house R&D. 
The Literature on Large Firms’ Industrial Research Labs  
Until the last decade or two, most economists and business historians would have 
agreed with Schumpeter (1942) that large firms had become the drivers of innovation in 
the U.S. economy.
1  The avidity with which large firms built industrial research 
laboratories from the 1920s into the 1960s (see Mowery and Rosenberg 1989) certainly 
indicates that their executives thought the labs were a superior way of organizing 
technological discovery. Moreover, there seemed to be good theoretical reasons to 
believe they were right.  In the first place, the electro-chemical technologies of the second 
industrial revolution were much more complex than the mechanical technologies of the 
first.  Not only did successful invention require much greater investments in both 
physical and human capital, it required the kind of coordinated teamwork at which 
industrial research labs excelled.  Second, inventors are better able, as a general rule, to 
solve production problems or create desirable new products if they have access to 
knowledge gained in manufacturing and marketing.  Because this kind of knowledge is 
largely firm-specific, it is not easily acquired by outsiders, but it can readily be 
                                                 
1 Examples from different parts of the literature include Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman 1958; Chandler 
1977; Hughes 1989; Lazonick 1991; Teece 1993; Cohen and Klepper 1996. 5 
 
transmitted to researchers in a firm’s own R&D facilities.  Third, in-house R&D can 
solve the information problems that make it difficult for independent inventors to find 
buyers for their inventions and hence impede the commercialization of new technologies.  
Before buyers will invest in an invention, they need to be able to estimate its value—to 
assess, for example, the extent to which a new process will lower production costs, or 
whether a novel product is likely to appeal to consumers.  But sellers of inventions have 
to worry that buyers will steal their ideas, so they may not be willing to reveal enough 
information about their discoveries to effectuate a sale.  These problems can be avoided 
by moving the process of technological discovery in-house.
2 
Of course, there were always dissenters who argued that the value of in-house 
R&D for large firms was less a matter of efficiency than of market dominance through 
the control of important technologies (see, for example, Reich 1977, 1980, and 1985).  
There was also a large literature that questioned the relationship between firm size and 
innovation and suggested that most big businesses were considerably larger than the 
threshold at which size mattered (see, for examples, Scherer 1965 and Cohen, Levin, and 
Mowery 1987).  However, it was not until the 1990s, when large firms began to cut back 
their R&D expenditures and even shut down their labs, that scholars began seriously to 
question the idea that in-house R&D was a superior way of organizing technological 
discovery (Rosenbloom and Spencer 1996).  As some then pointed out, there were 
important information and contracting problems associated with the movement of R&D 
in-house that were different from those that afflicted the market exchange of 
technological ideas but potentially just as troublesome.  In order to learn about and gain 
                                                 
2 For examples of scholars who have made these arguments, see Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Teece 1986 and 
1988, Mowery 1983 and 1995, Hughes 1989, and Zeckhauser 1996. 6 
 
control of new technologies developed in their facilities, for example, firms had to invest 
in monitoring their employees’ activities and to create incentives that aligned employees’ 
interests with those of the firms.  It was not easy, however, to design a reward structure 
that induced employees to work hard at generating new technological ideas without 
discouraging cooperation and the sharing of information within the firm (Lamoreaux and 
Sokoloff 1999).  The problems of managing research employees were greatly magnified, 
moreover, when firms started hiring university trained scientists who wanted to raise their 
status in the academic community by publishing discoveries their employers would prefer 
to keep proprietary, and who were more interested in working on scientifically interesting 
problems than in improving their firm’s bottom line (Leslie 1980, Wise 1985; Smith and 
Hounshell 1985, Hounshell and Smith 1988).  In addition, the informational advantages 
of locating R&D inside the firm turned out not to be as great as expected because 
research labs were often sited at a remove from the company’s other facilities.  It required 
considerable and continuous managerial effort to keep communication flowing across the 
different units of the firm (Hounshell and Smith 1988, Usselman 2007; Lipartito 2009). 
At the same time as scholars were highlighting the problems faced by industrial 
research laboratories, they were also showing that the difficulties associated with 
transacting for technology in the marketplace were not as great as hitherto believed.  
Although patent rights are never perfectly enforced, they provide enough protection to 
enable inventors to engage in market exchange.  Moreover, the information problems that 
afflict this kind of trade can be solved in a number of ways.  Firms seeking to purchase 
outside technologies can invest in facilities for assessing them and can work to cultivate a 
reputation for safeguarding inventors’ interests; intermediaries who possess the trust of 7 
 
parties on both sides of the market can take charge of facilitating exchange; and talented 
inventors can establish track records that give buyers confidence in the worth of their 
discoveries (Gans and Sterns 2003; Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1999 and 2007).  Naomi 
Lamoreaux and Kenneth Sokoloff (1996, 2001, and 2003) demonstrated that a vibrant 
trade in patented inventions developed during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
intermediated by patent agents and lawyers, that enabled talented independent inventors 
to specialize in technological discovery.  Steven Usselman (2002) and Stephen Adams 
and Orville Butler (1999) provided examples of firms that built reputations that 
encouraged inventors to bring them their ideas.  Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri, and 
Alfonso Gambardella (2001) documented the revival of trade in patented technology in 
high tech industries in the late twentieth century.  Moreover, scholars have uncovered 
considerable evidence that large firms continued to purchase inventions from outsiders 
even after they created industrial research laboratories.  Indeed, David Mowery (1995) 
has shown that the original function of most in-house R&D facilities was to keep abreast 
of (and vet for purchase) externally generated technology (see also Lamoreaux and 
Sokoloff 1999 and 2007).  Tom Nicholas (2009) has used geo-coded data on the location 
of inventors and research labs to show that a significant fraction of the most valuable 
patents acquired by large firms during the 1920s were most likely not generated in the 
firms’ research laboratories. Eric Hintz (2007) has provided case-study evidence showing 
that, even in the heyday of the industrial research lab in the 1950s, large firms transacted 
for important technologies with outside inventors who insisted on maintaining their 
independence. 8 
 
The New History of Equity Markets 
If the 1920s was the decade when large firms first began to build industrial 
research laboratories in significant numbers, it was also the decade when securities 
markets began to channel funds to firms on the technological cutting edge.  To the extent 
that the recipients of these funds were the very same enterprises that were building in-
house R&D facilities, the history of the growth of equity markets would simply reinforce 
the standard view that large firms were the main drivers of innovation in the twentieth 
century.  But recent research has shown that small entrepreneurial enterprises also 
obtained access to equity markets during this period, a development that is not consistent 
with the dominant narrative of American technological history. 
During the nineteenth century trading on the markets was pretty much limited to 
the securities of banks, railroads (bonds, not equities), other transportation companies, 
and utilities (Navin and Sears 1955; Cull, et al. 2006).  The number of industrials whose 
securities were listed on the New York Stock Exchange could be counted on one’s 
fingers, and the number whose unlisted securities traded in New York was also very low 
(Baskin and Miranti 1997).  Industrials had a greater presence on regional exchanges 
such as Boston’s, but even there their shares traded only infrequently (Martin 1898).  The 
general view among scholars is that problems of asymmetric information limited the 
public’s appetite for equities.  Markets were unregulated, firms reported little information 
about their affairs, and insiders manipulated both the flow of information and corporate 
decisions to their advantage (De Long 1991, Baskin and Miranti 1997, White 2003). 
Even the savvy could get taken, as Commodore Vanderbilt found when officers of the 9 
 
Erie Railroad responded to his attempt to buy control by cranking up the printing press 
and turning out more and more new shares of Erie stock (Adams 1869). 
By the turn of the century, however, private parties with an interest in expanding 
the reach of the securities markets were taking steps to increase the confidence of 
investors. For example, the New York Stock Exchange instituted a rule change in 1896 
requiring firms listed on the exchange to publish audited balance sheets.  A few firms had 
already begun to provide this kind of information on their own, but the new rule helped to 
make the exchange an imprimatur of quality, increasing trading, the value of listed 
shares, and not coincidentally, the price of a seat on the exchange (Neal and Davis 2007).  
At the same time, investment bankers such as J. P. Morgan exploited the reputations for 
probity they had built up over the years to expand the market for specific securities.  
Morgan had worked out a technique for building investors’ confidence when he 
reorganized bankrupt railroads during the 1890s, putting his own people on the boards of 
directors to reassure stockholders that the business would be run in their interests 
(Carosso 1987).  The railroads’ return to profitability enhanced his reputation, and 
Morgan used the same method to promote the securities of the giant consolidations he 
orchestrated at the turn of the century.  Studies by J. Bradford De Long (1991) and 
Miguel Simon (1998) suggest that stockholders responded by flocking to buy the 
securities of “Morganized” firms and also profited handsomely from their purchases. 
This record of profitability whetted investors’ appetites for securities, but it was 
not until the 1920s that the market really took off.  Investment bankers had developed 
new techniques during World War I to sell Liberty Bonds.  With the return of “normalcy” 
in the 1920s, they applied what they had learned to the sale of equities.  Eager to enter 10 
 
this business, commercial banks circumvented laws that prevented them from dealing in 
stocks by setting up affiliates to sell securities to their customers. At the same time, 
enterprising financiers brought large numbers of small investors into the market for the 
first time by creating new investment vehicles that gave them access to diversified 
portfolios. The most important of these, the investment trust, served much the same 
purpose as mutual funds do today (Carosso 1970; White 1984 and 1990; De Long 1991; 
O’Sullivan 2007).  Sales were also fueled during this period by competition between the 
NYSE and the New York Curb Exchange (which, like the NASDAQ more recently, 
specialized in issues of newer firms in technologically dynamic industries), by the growth 
of regional exchanges such as Cleveland’s (which promoted the securities of local 
enterprises), and by the development of a national network of dealers that sold securities 
“over the counter” (O’Sullivan 2007; Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokoloff 2006 and 
2007; Federer 2008). 
As investors lapped up what the bankers initially had to offer, firms began to issue 
more and more new securities.  Mary O’Sullivan (2007) has shown that the number and 
size of new corporate stock issues soared in the early twentieth century, reaching levels 
during the late 1920s that in real terms were not attained again until the 1980s.  Even if 
one leaves out the bubble years of 1928 and 1929, issues were higher as a proportion of 
GDP during the 1910s and 1920s than in any other period of American history except the 
recent dot-com boom.  Moreover, the great bulk of the issues consisted of common stock, 
with investors seeking to profit as much or more from a run-up in share prices as from 
dividend payments. 11 
 
It might be thought that the primary beneficiaries of this growth in the securities 
markets would be large, well-established firms for the simple reason that investors could 
readily gather information about them (Calomiris 1995).  Certainly, as Tom Nicholas 
(2003, 2007, and 2008) has shown, during the 1920s investors particularly favored the 
equities of large firms with R&D facilities and substantial portfolios of patents in cutting-
edge technologies (see also White 1990).  But this appetite for technology stocks seems 
to have spilled over to smaller firms as well.  The most obvious evidence is the enormous 
expansion in the number of firms about which the financial press reported information.  
Whereas only a handful of industrials were even mentioned in the pages of the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle in the 1890s, during the late 1920s Moody’s 
devoted more than three thousand pages of its annual securities manual to financial 
information on individual industrial enterprises.  O’Sullivan (2007) has shown that 
investors were particularly attracted to new firms in “high-tech” industries such as radios 
and aviation.  The advent of commercial broadcasting stimulated a craze for radio stocks 
during the early 1920s that led to so many initial public offerings (IPOs) that wags 
estimated the number of new shares to be about equal to the number of radios sold.  
Similarly, after Charles Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight captivated the public’s 
imagination, soaring interest in aviation stocks elicited about 125 additional offerings of 
securities, many of them from new entrants to the industry.  O’Sullivan has calculated 
that the medium age of the issuers was only 0.4 years! Most of the new securities 
promoted during the 1920s were not listed on the NYSE, but were instead traded on 
regional exchanges, on the curb market, over the counter, or through more informal 
channels. 12 
 
The implication of the literature on the growth of equity markets is that SMEs on 
the technological cutting edge were increasingly able to tap into broader capital markets 
to finance their inventive activities. This implication, however, is difficult to square with 
the standard argument that industrial research laboratories had already begun to displace 
entrepreneurial enterprises as a locus of technological discovery by the late 1920s.  In the 
rest of the paper we bring systematic evidence to bear on this problem.  Our aim is to 
determine whether there was a reorganization of technological discovery during the early 
twentieth century in favor of large firms, or whether SMEs (and perhaps also independent 
inventors) continued to play an important role in the generation and exploitation of new 
technologies. 
Data Sources 
We approach this problem through the analysis of patent data.
3  The starting point 
for our analysis is four random cross-sectional samples of patents that we drew from the 
Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Patents for the years 1870-71, 1890-91, 1910-11, 
and 1928-29.
4  For each patent in the samples we recorded a brief description of the 
invention, the name and location of the patentee(s), and the names and locations of any 
                                                 
3 We recognize that some scholars would object that large firms often eschewed patenting in favor of 
secrecy, taking advantage of the new legal protections for trade secrets that emerged in the early twentieth 
century (Fisk 2001), but we see no reason to assume a priori that large firms were more likely to favor 
secrecy than small firms.  Indeed, economists working on late twentieth-century data have sometimes 
found precisely the opposite.  Using survey data, they have shown, for example, that small enterprises 
worry that they will be not be able to protect their intellectual property against infringement by large 
firms—that they will be for all practical purposes defenseless against giants with the resources to hire the 
best legal talent (Lerner 1995; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2002; Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen 2007).  
Some scholars might also object that large firms devoted a significant proportion of their R&D resources to 
systematizing and elaborating new technologies in ways that often were not patentable (see Usselman 2002 
on the railroads, for example).  That may well have been the case, but our primary aim in this paper is to 
understand whether large firms with R&D facilities were the dominant source of new technological 
discoveries by the late 1920s. 
4 The 1870-71 sample amounts to about 6 percent of total patents; the other samples about 4 percent. 13 
 
assignees who obtained rights to the invention before the patent was actually issued.  We 
then linked the patents to other information we collected on the assignees to whom the 
patentees transferred their patent rights.  For example, we looked up each company that 
received a patent in the directories of industrial research laboratories compiled by the 
National Research Council (NRC).  We also collected information about companies 
receiving patents from financial publications:  the Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
for the 1870-71 and 1890-91 cross-sections; Poor’s Manual of Industrials for 1910-11; 
and Moody’s Manual of Investments for 1928-29.  Finally, we looked up both individual 
and company assignees wherever possible in city directories. 
The information we obtained from these financial publications and city directories 
enabled us to classify a large number of the companies who obtained patents by size, 
measured in terms of the firms’ total assets (or in a few cases where that information was 
not available, total capitalization).   We were also able to determine for a large number of 
firms whether the inventor was an officer, director, or proprietor of the company to which 
he (or in rare cases she) assigned the patent.  Our basic strategy was to use this 
information to look for changes over time in the relationship between patentees and their 
assignees and in the types of companies obtaining assignments.  Were inventors 
increasingly less likely over time to be principals in the firms obtaining their patents?  
Were they more likely to be employees?   Was there a shift over time in the types of 
firms obtaining assignments toward very large firms or toward firms with in-house 
research laboratories? 14 
 
The Organization of Inventive Activity before the Great Depression 
If there was a reorganization of inventive activity during the early twentieth 
century in favor of large firms with their own R&D facilities, one would expect to find, 
first of all, that inventors were assigning an increasing proportion of their patents to 
companies by the time of issue (because employees typically had to transfer their patents 
automatically to their firms),
5 and second, that large firms with research labs would 
account for a growing proportion of patent assignments.  Certainly, the evidence bears 
the first expectation out.  As Table 1 shows, the fraction of patents assigned at issue 
increased quite steeply over time, rising from 16.1 percent in the 1870-71 cross section to 
56.1 percent in 1928-29, with 87.2 percent of assignments at issue in the latter sample 
going to companies.  The proportion of patents that went to large companies also 
increased dramatically.  For the 1928-29 cross section, the proportion assigned to 
enterprises reported by Moody’s as having assets of at least $10 million was 20.5 percent, 
and 16.1 percent went to companies in that category listed by the NRC as having 
industrial research laboratories.
6 
These last figures represented a significant increase over those for 1910-11, when 
few large firms had labs and the proportion of patents that went to firms with more than 
$10 million in assets was only 3.4 percent.  The question, however, is whether the 1928-
29 numbers are large enough to make the case that such enterprises were coming to 
                                                 
5 Contracts requiring employees to assign all patents to their employers became increasingly prevalent by 
the 1920s. See Fisk (1998) and Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999). 
6 It is important to bear in mind that assignments to companies can come from outside inventors as well as 
from employees, so our figures overestimate the proportion of patents generated by the firms concerned.  
Our analysis includes only utility patents granted to residents of the United States.  Adding patents awarded 
to foreigners would not change the analysis because there were so few of them.  Even in 1930, there were 
only about 40 in the sample, and intriguingly, somewhat more of them were acquired by firms not reported 
in Moody’s than by large firms.  We also exclude from the analysis the small number of patents that were 
assigned to foreign companies and the small number of patents that were reissued. 15 
 
dominate the process of technological discovery.  Over the same period, the proportion of 
patents assigned to companies not covered by publications like Moody’s also rose—from 
13.5 to 22.1 percent.  The latter number is slightly larger than the proportion of patents 
that went to large firms in the same year, so it would seem that small firms were holding 
their own as generators of patentable technology. 
There was also a dramatic increase between 1910-11 and 1928-29 (from 4 to 9 
percent) in the share of patents acquired by firms where the patentee was an officer, 
director, or proprietor or that bore the patentee’s surname (Table 2, Panel A).
7  We 
presume that these firms were formed to exploit a technology invented by the patentee 
and so treat the existence of a patentee-principal as sign of the entrepreneurial character 
of the company. Sometimes the patentee was clearly the moving force behind the 
enterprise and held a position (such as president or secretary/treasurer) that indicated his 
active involvement in running the business.  Sometimes another person played the role of 
entrepreneur, and the patentee received an ownership interest and a largely honorific title 
(such as vice president) in order to ensure his continuing participation in developing and 
improving the technology. 
As Table 2 indicates, there was relatively little overlap between the firms we are 
defining as entrepreneurial and the large firms covered by Moody’s, particularly those 
that NRC surveys indicated had industrial research labs.  In 1928-29 only 4 percent of the 
assignments to large firms with R&D labs involved patentee-principals, as opposed to 26 
                                                 
7 Information on directors’ identities comes from city directories and from financial publications such as 
Moody’s.  Our figures understate the number of patents awarded to principals of firms because we are not 
able to identify the officers and directors of small companies located in areas without city directories.  Our 
figures are also underestimates because we miss companies with inventor-principals in which the inventor 
did not happen to receive a patent in 1928 or 1929. Some of the increase we observe may simply be a result 
of the growth in the number of firms covered by national financial publications.  It is doubtful, however, 
whether this expansion in coverage explains much of the change because relatively few of the firms for 
which financial reports are available actually had patentee principals.   16 
 
percent of the assignments to firms in the “other” category.  Moreover, from Table 3 we 
can see that fully 66.3 percent of the assignments by patentee-principals went to “other” 
companies and only 7.1 percent to large firms with R&D labs.  The “other” category 
consists of firms for which we were not able to find reports in Moody’s, which we 
assume means that they were generally much smaller in size than those that for which 
there were published financial reports.  Yet another striking difference between the 
entrepreneurial firms and the large-scale enterprises found in Moody’s is that they tended 
to be located in different parts of the country.  Whereas large firms were 
disproportionately concentrated in the Middle Atlantic region, enterprises in which the 
patentee was a principal were more likely to be found in the East North Central states 
(Table 4 and Table 6).   Hence in 1928-29, 53.5 percent of the patents acquired by large 
firms went to assignees located in the Middle Atlantic and only 29.0 percent to those in 
the East North Central region.  By contrast, 43.9 percent of the patents assigned by 
patentee-principals went to firms in the East North Central states and only 23.5 percent to 
those in the Middle Atlantic.
8 
The Middle Atlantic and the East North Central regions were the nation’s two 
main technology centers by the late 1920s, each accounting for roughly one third of total 
patents (Table 4). The two regions had comparable rates of patenting per capita (Figure 
1) and similar overall rates of assignment (Table 5).  In both, moreover, large firms 
obtained a greater share of assignments in 1928-29 than they had in 1910-11.  
Nonetheless, to the extent that there was a reorganization of inventive activity in favor of 
large-firm R&D during this period, the change seems to have gone a lot further in the 
Middle Atlantic region than in the East North Central.  In the former 32.5 percent of all 
                                                 
8 On this point, see also Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 2009. 17 
 
patents went to large firms and only 19.5 percent to “other” companies in 1928-29; in the 
latter the proportions were reversed, with 19.7 going to large firms and 27.5 to “other” 
companies (Table 5).  Moreover, the proportion of assignments that went to 
entrepreneurial firms (that is, to firms where the patentee was a principal) was more than 
twice as high in the East North Central as in the Middle Atlantic (Table 5).  Rather than a 
complete reorganization of technological discovery, therefore, the data suggest that two 
alternative modes of organizing technological discovery coexisted during the early 
twentieth century.  Large firms may have dominated in the Middle Atlantic, but the East 
North Central continued to spawn significant numbers of entrepreneurial startups. 
Questions of Importance and Technological Sector 
Before one can conclude definitively that two alternative modes of technological 
discovery coexisted during the early twentieth century, one must consider the possibility 
that the patents assigned to entrepreneurial firms were on the whole less significant than 
those acquired by large firms with R&D labs.  After all, patent counts can be notoriously 
misleading because they weigh equally inventions that are of fundamentally different 
importance.  One must also consider the possibility that entrepreneurial firms operated in 
different technological sectors than large firms with R&D labs—that is, that the patents 
they acquired were less “high tech.” 
The question of importance is difficult to resolve for the early twentieth century 
because patents were not subject to renewal fees and it was not yet common practice for 
inventors to cite prior art in their applications.  We employ two alternative, but 
unfortunately highly imperfect, measures to assess whether the patents assigned to large 18 
 
firms were generally more significant than those assigned to their entrepreneurial 
counterparts. First, following Nicholas (2003), we use information on whether or not a 
patent in our sample was cited much later on (by a patent granted between 1975 and 
2002).  Second, we collect information on the number of claims allowed in the patent 
grant (Lerner 1994; Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004). 
As Table 2 (Panel B) shows, the first measure does not favor large firms with 
industrial research laboratories.  Only 25 percent of the patents assigned at issue in 1928-
29 to this type of firm were cited by a patent granted between 1975 and 2002, whereas 
the proportion for firms not included in Moody’s was 32 percent.
9  This result, however, 
may not be all that surprising.  We know that large firms like the American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company (AT&T) patented virtually all the inventions devised by their 
employees, whether important or not, for morale reasons and because even minor patents 
could be useful for blocking rivals’ incursions in their markets (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
1999; Reich 1977, 1980, and 1985).  Even in absolute terms, however, large companies 
with R&D laboratories accounted for a much smaller proportion of patents cited after 
1975 than did firms in the “other” category:  12.2 versus 21.8 percent (see Table 3, panel 
B).  Intriguingly, patents that were not assigned at issue accounted for almost half (48.3) 
of those cited after 1975 (Table 3) and had a higher probability of being referenced by 
late-twentieth-century patents (36 percent) than those in any of the other assignment 
categories (Table 2).  The explanation may be that inventors sought to maintain control of 
their most valuable discoveries in order to profit more from exploiting them. This 
possibility fits with work by Lamoreaux, Margaret Levenstein, and Sokoloff (2006 and 
                                                 
9 None of our results change when we use the number of later citations as a measure of importance rather 
than simply whether or not the patent was ever cited. 19 
 
2007) showing that important inventors in the Cleveland region often had considerable 
bargaining power vis-à-vis their financial backers and that they exercised that power by 
licensing rather than assigning their patent rights to their companies. 
Regression analysis of the 1928-29 sample confirms the descriptive finding that 
the patents acquired by large firms with R&D labs were no more likely to be cited by 
late-twentieth-century patents than those acquired by “other” firms.  To keep the focus on 
the different types of enterprises, we restrict our attention to patents assigned at issue to 
companies.
10 The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if the 
invention was cited by a patent awarded in 1975-2002.  The independent variables 
include dummies for the size category of firms in terms of total assets (the omitted 
category is firms for which we have no financial information
11), whether the NRC listed 
the firm as having an industrial research lab, whether the inventor was a principal of the 
firm, the region in which the assignee was located (the omitted category is the Middle 
Atlantic), and whether the patent was in a high-tech industry for the time.  We use two 
alternative definitions of high-tech.  The first (high-tech1) is based on our reading of the 
text of the patent.  It defines patents in the following industries as high-tech and all others 
as not:  electrical machinery and products, chemicals, petroleum, plastics and rubber, 
automobiles, primary metals, mining machinery, and transportation equipment, as well as 
the machinery used in production in these industries.  The second (high-tech2) defines as 
high-tech patents that were classified by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002) as falling in 
technology subclasses 11-49 (based on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s 
                                                 
10 The results in Table 7 do not change when we run the estimations on all patents, except that the 
coefficients on the dummy for high-tech in the first two estimations become consistently negative and 
weakly significant. 
11 This category includes firms for which Moody’s did not include information on assets or capital, as well 
as firms that Moody’s did not cover. 20 
 
classification scheme): chemicals, computers and communication technology, drugs and 
medical devices, and electrical and electronics. The estimations are probits, and the 
reported figures are the marginal effects of changes in the independent variables. 
As the first four columns in Table 7 show, none of the coefficients is statistically 
significant.
12  Patents assigned to firms with more than $10 million in assets were no 
more likely to be cited at the end of the century than those that went to firms not included 
in Moody’s, and firms with R&D labs were no more likely to acquire patents that would 
be cited later than those without.  Indeed, the point estimates suggest that patents 
acquired by large firms with R&D labs were somewhat less likely to be cited.  We 
obtained the same results when we included dummies for the individual technology 
subclasses that make up high-tech2 (not shown).  In other words, even within subclasses, 
the patents of large firms with R&D labs were no more likely to be cited later on than 
those of small firms.
13  Nor were there any significant regional differences in the 
frequency of citations.  Patents assigned to firms in the Middle Atlantic were no more nor 
less likely to be cited than those assigned to firms in the East North Central region.  
Regardless of how we define high-tech, moreover, patents in the cutting-edge industries 
of the time were no more likely to be cited than other patents, and most of the point 
estimates have the wrong sign. 
This last result in particular raises the question of whether citations from a much 
later period are a good measure of importance.  It is at least possible that technology was 
changing more rapidly in high-tech industries than in low-tech ones, making inventions 
in the former obsolete more quickly and thus less likely to be relevant to patents granted 
                                                 
12 Including interactions between the R&D and size variables does not change the result.  We do not report 
these estimations, however, because of serious problems of multicolinearity. 
13 We do not report these results because of small cell sizes. 21 
 
in the late twentieth century.  For example, Lee de Forest’s patents for amplifiers were 
unquestionably important at the time, but because the devices used vacuum-tube 
technology they were not cited after 1974.
14  On the other hand, one could argue that 
patents in old industries circa 1930 were even more likely to be irrelevant by the late 
twentieth century and hence still less likely to be cited. 
Because of our doubts about the validly of late-twentieth-century citations as an 
indication of  a patent’s importance, we collected data for an alternative measure that has 
been suggested in the literature—the number of claims allowed in each patent grant 
(Lerner 1994; Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004).  The estimations (here negative 
binomial regressions) are reported in Table 7, columns 5 through 8.  Large firms had 
more claims per patent than those not covered in national financial publications, which by 
this measure would seem to indicate that large firms’ patents were more important on 
average than those obtained by small firms.  Another interpretation, however, is that large 
firms had superior access to legal expertise and thus were able to secure approval for 
more claims during the examination process.
15  Regardless, patents acquired by firms that 
had R&D labs were not more important by this measure than those acquired by firms that 
did not; the point estimates have the wrong sign and are weakly significant in the first 
two specifications.  Moreover, the negative coefficients on the high-tech dummies 
(weakly significant for the second of our two classification schemes) raise doubts about 
the validity of the number of claims as a measure of importance, just as they did for late-
twentieth-century citations. 
                                                 
14 We searched in Google patents for de Forest’s patents that included the word “vacuum.”  Unlike de 
Forest’s other patents, none of these were cited in the late twentieth century. 
15 When we presented this paper at the NYU Law School, faculty and students in the audience were 
skeptical that the number of claims reflected anything but the skill of the patent lawyer. 22 
 
As for the question of whether the patents acquired by large firms with industrial 
research laboratories were more likely to be in high-tech industries than those acquired 
by firms operating below the financial radar screen, the answer is yes.  For the years 
1928-29, fully 78 percent of the patents acquired by the former were in high-tech 
industries according to our first definition and 46 percent according to our second (Table 
2, Panels C and D).  The figures for firms not found in Moody’s were only 52 percent and 
21 percent respectively.  As the probit regressions in Table 8 show, by our first definition 
both large firms and firms with R&D labs were significantly more likely to acquire high-
tech patents than firms without financial reports in Moody’s.  By our second measure, 
however, only firms with R&D labs were significantly more specialized in cutting-edge 
technology.  The point estimates for entrepreneurial firms were negative, though not 
significant, in all of the regressions. Finally, firms in the Middle Atlantic, where most of 
large enterprises with industrial research labs were located, were generally more likely to 
acquire high-tech patents than were firms in other regions, including the East North 
Central, and the differences were particularly apparent for our second measure. 
Before one leaps to the conclusion that large firms with industrial research 
laboratories were dominating inventive activity in the high-tech sectors of the economy 
by the late 1920s, it is important to note that firms not included in Moody’s still 
accounted for a substantial proportion of high-tech patents:  22.7 percent of the total for 
high-tech1 and 19.3 percent for high-tech2, compared respectively to 24.8 and 30.7 
percent for large firms with R&D labs (Table 3, Panels C and D). So did firms in the East 
North Central:  32.0 percent for high-tech 1 and 27.3 percent for high-tech2, compared 
respectively to 38.0 and 42.0 percent for the Middle Atlantic (Table 4, Panel B). 23 
 
Moreover, it is important to note that large firms were disproportionately high-tech as 
early as 1910-11, when few of them had R&D labs.  Indeed, in 1910-11 large firms 
without R&D labs were much more likely to acquire high-tech patents than the firms that 
pioneered in establishing in-house research facilities (Table 2, Panels C and D).  
Furthermore, it is not at all clear how many of the patents acquired by large firms with 
R&D facilities actually originated in the companies’ labs.  For the 1928-29 cross section, 
36.9 percent of the patents assigned to large firms with research labs came from patentees 
who were located in a completely different state from any of their assignees’ labs.
16  This 
result is somewhat larger than that of Nicholas (2009), who also found that a significant 
fraction of patents acquired by a sample of large firms came from inventors who resided 
beyond commuting distance from the firms’ labs.
17  It is also consistent with the 
argument (Mowery 1995, Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1999) that the reason that many firms 
established R&D labs in the first place was to improve their ability to assess inventions 
offered for sale by outside inventors.  To give one example, at the end of World War I 
Standard Oil of New Jersey founded its first research department on the principle that 
“new ideas and inventions … would arise in the main from external sources, and that [the 
department’s] primary job … would be to uncover these ideas, test them out, and carry 
                                                 
16 Adding a variable for whether the patentee resided in the same state as one of the company’s labs does 
not change the estimations in Tables 7 or 8.  The variable was never significant, though intriguingly the 
point estimates suggest that patents by inventors located in the same state as a lab were less likely to be 
cited than those by inventors who resided in other states.  
17  Nicholas found that a quarter of the inventions assigned during the 1920s to 69 large firms operating 94 
industrial research labs came from inventors who resided beyond commuting distance of the labs. Nicholas 
also found that the patents obtained from distant inventors were substantially more important on average 
(more likely to be cited by late twentieth century patents) than those acquired from inventors who lived 
within commuting distance.  In the case of the General Electric Company (GE), Nicholas was able to check 
his list of inventors against employment records and found that about a fifth of the patents GE acquired 
came from inventors who were not employees.   24 
 
them forward to some practical end”—not, as has been generally assumed, to foster 
“primary research” (Gibb and Knowlton 1956). 
Finally, our data enable us to test one of the arguments that scholars have offered 
for the superiority of research laboratories—that they facilitated the teamwork required 
for effective innovation in the complex, science-based technologies of the second 
industrial revolution.  If we take the presence of multiple inventors on a patent to be an 
indication of teamwork, we find that large firms, even those with industrial research 
laboratories, had only slightly more of it.  Fourteen percent of the patents acquired by 
large firms with R&D facilities were granted to more than one inventor, as opposed to 10 
percent of those acquired by firms not included in Moody’s (Table 2, panel E).  That 
difference, however, is not statistically significant, as the regressions in the last four 
columns of Table 8 show.
18 
To recap the results thus far, by the 1920s there seen to have been two main 
regions of inventive activity in the U.S., each organized along different lines.  In the 
Middle Atlantic, large firms with in-house R&D facilities predominated, whereas the 
East North Central was characterized by entrepreneurial startups.  Assignments to large 
firms with R&D facilities accounted for an increased proportion of patents by the late 
1920s, but assignments to firms without access to national capital markets represented a 
larger (and still growing) share of patents. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the 
patents acquired by large firms with research labs were more important than those 
                                                 
18 There may have been some bias against filing joint patents because they could pose special legal 
difficulties.   For example, in cases where establishing priority was critical, the date of the invention could 
not precede the date when the inventors first started working together. Nonetheless, patents for inventions 
that were the joint product of more than one inventor were invalid unless all the inventors were named in 
the patent, and firms with R&D laboratories would have had to be very careful on this point.  By the 1920s, 
moreover, the courts were no longer penalizing inventors who inadvertently, without fraudulent intent, 
mistakenly listed a joint inventor on a patent.  See Robb 1922, 113-114; and Robinson 1890, I, 561-73. 25 
 
acquired by firms in other categories.  Large firms’ patents were, if anything, less likely 
to be cited by late-twentieth-century patents than those of other firms, and though they 
included more claims on average, that was not the case for patents assigned to firms with 
R&D labs.  Although large firms’ patents (and those in the Middle Atlantic) were more 
likely to be in high-tech industries than those of small firms (and firms in the East North 
Central), the latter maintained a significant presence in these industries, especially 
according to our first, broader definition.  Moreover, the direction of the relationship 
between large firms’ investments in industrial research labs and the generation of high-
tech inventions is by no means certain.  Large firms disproportionately acquired high-
tech patents in 1910-11, when only a few of them had research labs; many of the patents 
acquired by large firms with R&D labs came from inventors located in a different state 
from the companies’ labs; and there was no significant association between large-firm 
R&D and collaborative invention.   Rather than enabling large firms to dominate the 
process of technological discovery, it may simply be, as Mowery and others have argued, 
that in-house research labs helped them make better decisions about which of the 
complicated second-industrial-revolution technologies being proffered on the market they 
should buy. 
The Role of Equity Markets 
For entrepreneurial firms to make important contributions to technological 
discovery, especially in the complex science-based technologies of the second industrial 
revolution, they needed to be able to raise capital.  One clear advantage that large firms 
with R&D labs had over their entrepreneurial counterparts was ready access to the 26 
 
nation’s main financial markets.  As Table 9, Panel B shows, the vast majority of patents 
assigned to large firms (69.9 percent) and to firms with R&D labs (60.1 percent) went to 
enterprises whose shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  By 
contrast, the proportion of patents acquired by entrepreneurial firms that were listed on 
the NYSE was comparatively miniscule (7.2 percent), and even if one adds to that firms 
whose equities traded on the secondary or regional exchanges, the total was still only 
19.5 percent. Nonetheless, it is still possible that the growth of equity markets during the 
1920s facilitated the formation of entrepreneurial startups.  The promise of being able to 
go to the capital markets down the road may well have encouraged local financiers to 
invest in firms formed to exploit new technological discoveries. 
If such a promise did help entrepreneurial startups obtain financing, the equity 
markets that mattered most would have been the regional exchanges and secondary New 
York markets like the Curb or the Produce Exchange—not the NYSE.  Few 
entrepreneurial firms would have been able to jump directly to the Big Board because the 
requirements for listing were too stringent.  Firms had to submit five years of financial 
statements as well as documents detailing their assets and liabilities, and relatively few 
passed the listing committee’s muster.  In 1927 the committee accepted 116 of 300 
applications, in 1928 16 out of 571, and in 1929 80 out of 759 (White 2009).  As a 
general rule, the only new firms that could meet the NYSE’s standards were 
combinations formed by merger or firms with extensive financial backing that were born 
large in order to operate efficiently in industries characterized by economies of scale. 
Entrepreneurial startups would have had a much easier time listing on a regional 
exchange or a secondary market in New York because these exchanges deliberately 27 
 
adopted laxer standards in order to attract this kind of business (White 2009; Ripley 
1927). Moreover, unlike the NYSE, listing was not a requirement for trading on these 
other exchanges.  Whether there was a market for a firm’s securities depended less on 
such formalities than on whether investors had sufficient information to evaluate the 
enterprise’s prospects.  Reports in national financial publications like Moody’s helped, 
but the kind of local knowledge that business people could accumulate about firms in 
their immediate vicinities probably mattered more. 
It is difficult to get directly at the role that regional and secondary exchanges 
played in encouraging entrepreneurial enterprises because the equities of most such firms 
in our sample did not trade on any of the markets, at least not at the time we observe them 
(Tables 9 and 10).  Indeed, most were too small even to be noticed by a publication such 
as Moody’s. We can, however, get a sense of the importance of the different exchanges 
by focusing our attention on the smaller firms for which we do have financial reports.  In 
1928-29 enterprises with assets of less than $10 million look much more like companies 
not covered by Moody’s than they do firms with more than $10 million in assets. 
Whereas most of the assignments to firms in the larger asset category went to enterprises 
with R&D labs, most of the assignments to these “small cap” firms went to companies 
that did not show up in the NRC lists as having industrial research facilities (Table 1). 
The proportion of their patents classified as high-tech was also more like that of 
companies in the “other” category than large-cap firms:  for high-tech1, 56 percent for 
small-cap firms and 52 percent for other companies, compared to 74 percent for large-cap 




 The small-cap firms also look very different from the larger firms in that 
a much greater share of the patents they acquired came from inventors who were 
principals in the enterprise.  In 1928-29 inventor principals generated 28 percent of the 
patents acquired by small-cap firms, compared to 26 percent for other companies and 
only 6 percent for large-cap firms (Table 2, Panel A, and Table 1).  Finally, small-cap 
firms, like firms with inventor-principals more generally, were disproportionately located 
in the East North Central region of the country, whereas large firms were concentrated in 
the Middle Atlantic (Table 4). 
For each of the small-cap and large-cap firms covered by Moody’s, we collected 
information on the markets where the firm’s equities traded (Table 10).  Not surprisingly, 
unlike the case for large-cap firms, very few of the patents assigned to small-cap firms 
(only 6.1 percent) went to companies listed on the Big Board (Table 9, Panel B).  
However, over half went to a firm whose equities traded on at least one other exchange—
18.9 percent to firms that traded on a regional exchange, 15.5 percent to firms that traded 
on a secondary New York market, and 8.8 percent to firms that traded on both a regional 
exchange and a secondary New York market.  The rest went to firms for which Moody’s 
did not provide listing information, and it is likely that the stock of these companies was 
closely held or that it traded only privately.  If we go further and break the data down 
regionally, we see that the securities of small-cap firms in the East North Central states 
were more likely to trade on regional equity markets, whereas those of small-cap firms in 
                                                 
19 The comparisons in this paragraph of all small-cap and all large-cap firms can be calculated using the 
counts in Table 1 as weights to add up the subcategories in Table 2.  For the firms not included in Moody’s, 
our figures on the proportion of inventors who were principals in the firms receiving their assignments are 
probably underestimates  because we obtained this information by looking up the firms in city directories 
and thus were not able to check assignments to firms located in areas not covered by this source. 29 
 
New England and the Middle Atlantic were more likely to trade on a secondary New 
York market.
20   
When we trace the listing histories of the firms in our sample in earlier financial 
publications (Table 11), we find that that relatively few of them jumped from regional or 
secondary markets to the Big Board. The large-cap firms whose equities traded on the 
NYSE in 1929 were not just small-cap firms that grew big and shifted their listing.  These 
firms for the most part were born large (often as a result of mergers), and their listing 
history seems to have begun on the NYSE.  Similarly, most of the firms whose stock 
traded on regional exchanges in 1929 were first listed there, and the same was true for 
firms that traded on the secondary New York markets.  The main exceptions were firms 
whose equities traded both on the secondary New York markets and on regional 
exchanges in 1929.  A significant proportion of those firms started on a regional 
exchange and only later gained access to New York capital through a secondary market.   
Some firms, it seems, were able to market their equities on a local exchange and then, as 
investors accumulated more information about the firm’s business, tap into broader 
markets in other regions.  But most firms’ access to capital markets remained local, with 
small firms in the East North Central turning primarily to exchanges in that region and 
those in the Middle Atlantic to secondary markets in New York. 
Although the evidence is by no means conclusive, the information on listing 
locations is consistent with the idea that the growth of regional capital markets, especially 
in the East North Central states, encouraged investment in entrepreneurial startups.   The 
most successful of these firms could anticipate being able to market their securities on 
exchanges in their home cities and perhaps move from there to one of the secondary 
                                                 
20 We do not show these further breakdowns to save space and because of small cell sizes. 30 
 
markets in New York, and it may well be that this anticipation was enough to spur 
business people in such areas to risk some of their assets in new enterprises.  Certainly, 
studies of Cleveland and Detroit by Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokoloff (2006 and 
2007) and Steven Klepper (2007) respectively point to the existence of local networks of 
notables eager to supply venture capital to innovative startups. 
The Reorganization of Inventive Activity 
We began this paper by discussing two literatures that have very different 
implications for our understanding of how the process of technological discovery was 
reorganized in the U.S. in the early twentieth century.  On the one hand, the literature on 
the rise of industrial research labs claims that invention was increasingly moving into 
large firms’ R&D facilities.  On the other, the literature on the growth of equity markets 
suggests that broadened access to funding enabled entrepreneurial firms to raise the 
capital they needed to play an ongoing role in technological discovery. 
Our analysis of the patent data indicates that there is some truth to both of these 
perspectives.  In the Middle Atlantic region of the country inventive activity was indeed 
moving into large firms’ industrial research facilities.  The East North Central, however, 
was home to a dynamic economy of entrepreneurial startups, supported (there is good 
reason to believe) by booming regional exchanges.  Neither of these centers of inventive 
activity seems to have had a particular edge over the other during the 1920s, as the two 
regions accounted for roughly equivalent shares of total patents and had similar rates of 
patenting per capita.  It is true that large firms in the Middle Atlantic were somewhat 
more specialized in the technologies associated with the second industrial revolution, but 31 
 
they had already developed this characteristic before they built most of their industrial 
research labs.  Moreover, the inventions acquired by large firms with R&D facilities were 
no more likely than those of firms without labs to be the product of teamwork, as 
measured by the presence of more than one name on the patent, and large firms still 
acquired a significant proportion of their patents from inventors whose state of residence 
indicates that they were unlikely to be employees of their assignees’ labs.     
Why then has the literature on the history of technology focused on the large 
firms of the Middle Atlantic region and ignored the vibrant entrepreneurial economy 
further west?  The answer, we think, lies in the events of the Great Depression, which hit 
small firms in the East North Central region much harder than large firms in the Middle 
Atlantic.
21  To measure the differential impact of the financial catastrophe on the two 
regions, we looked up the companies covered by Moody’s in 1929 in the edition of the 
manual published in 1935.  We then estimated the probability that firms that obtained 
patents in 1929 would suffer financial distress by 1935.  In the first four columns of 
Table 12, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if the patent was 
assigned to a firm for which Moody’s no longer published a report in 1935 or if the report 
indicated that the firm was in bankruptcy or being reorganized.
22 In the second four 
columns, the dependent variable also includes firms whose access to capital markets 
seems to have deteriorated over the period 1929 to 1935.
23  All of the estimates are 
probits, and the independent variables have the same definitions as in the previous tables. 
                                                 
21 On this point, see also Lamoreaux and Levenstein 2008. 
22 Most of the firms for which there were no reports were listed explicitly as dropped.  If small firms ran 
into financial trouble, Moody’s was  likely to stop publishing information about them, but the journal 
usually continued to cover large firms in the same condition because the prospects of these enterprises were 
of interest to significant numbers of readers.   
23 For the precise definition of this variable, see the notes to Table 12. 32 
 
The differential impact of the depression is clear from the estimations.   Although 
entrepreneurial firms do not seem to have been more negatively affected by the crisis 
than firms without patentee-principals, large firms were significantly less likely to suffer 
financial distress than small firms.
24  Moreover, firms with their own R&D facilities also 
came through the depression comparatively well.  As we have seen, both large firms and 
firms with R&D facilities were disproportionately located in the Middle Atlantic region.  
Yet even when we control for these characteristics, it is apparent that the depression hit 
that region less severely than it did other parts of the country.  Of particular interest, of 
course, are the coefficients for the East North Central region.  The point estimates are all 
suggestive of financial distress.  They are significant at the 5 percent level in the second  
set of estimations and at the 10 percent level in the first.
25 
The effect of the depression is also apparent in regional patenting rates ( Figure 
1), which held up much better during the 1930s in the Middle Atlantic than in the East 
North Central region.
26  Given the low levels of demand during the Great Depression, 
large firms did not find building new productive capacity an attractive strategy.  As 
Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg (1989) have shown, however, they greatly expanded 
their investments in R&D.
27  The number of new industrial research laboratories grew by 
590 between 1929 and 1936, an increase that compares favorably with the 660 new labs 
founded between 1919 and 1928.  Moreover, employment in industrial research labs shot 
up even more rapidly, multiplying nearly five times between 1927 and 1940 and raising 
                                                 
24 This result, of course, is not at all surprising.  On large firms’ high survival rates from the 1920s to the 
1960s, see Edwards 1975.  More generally, see also Averitt 1968.  
25 We do not report estimations that control for technology subclasses because of small cell sizes, but the 
results are the same except that the coefficient on the East North Central dummy increases in significance.  
26 Patenting rates in any given year reflect applications made several years before.  Hence the rise in 
patenting rates in most regions during the early years of the depression was a consequence of inventions 
generated mainly in the late 1920s. 
27 On this point, see also Bernstein 1987. 33 
 
the number of research employees per 1000 wage earners in firms with R&D facilities 
from 0.83 to 3.67.  As a result of these investments, large firms in the Middle Atlantic 
emerged from the depression with a stockpile of new technologies that enhanced their 
competitive position, whereas the smaller firms that survived in the East North Central 
had not been able to maintain the same level of patenting activity. 
During World War II government procurement policy favored large firms with 
industrial research labs, further encouraging this trend (in all regions of the country), and 
the number of research employees in industry again doubled (Blum 1976, Vatter 1985, 
Mowery and Rosenberg 1989).  When the economy revived in the war’s aftermath, 
therefore, large firms in the East North Central looked a lot more like their counterparts 
in the Middle Atlantic. Moreover, the regional exchanges that had fostered local 
investment in entrepreneurial startups during the 1920s never recovered.  The new 
Securities and Exchange Commission imposed general listing requirements equivalent to 
those on the NYSE on the regional and secondary exchanges, preventing those markets 
from continuing to provide a trading venue for enterprises that could not meet the Big 
Board’s stringent standards (White 2009). 
As a result of all these changes, little remained by the 1950s of the alternative 
entrepreneurial economy that had flourished during the 1920s in the East North Central 
part of the country.  Its contributions to technological discovery have been largely erased 
from our historical memory, and the scholarship of the late twentieth century has been 
written as if innovative regions like Silicon Valley were something entirely new.  Now 
that financial crises are once again buffeting the economy, it is useful to revisit this 
forgotten history.   The differential impact of the Great Depression on the large-firm 34 
 
economy of the Middle Atlantic and the entrepreneurial economy of the East North 
Central is a stark reminder of the competitive advantages that large firms can reap under 
such circumstances as a consequence of their superior access to capital.  It is also a useful 
warning about the dire consequences that macroeconomic shocks can have for innovative 




Adams, Charles F., Jr.  1869.  “A Chapter of Erie.”  North American Review 109 (July): 
30-106. 
Adams, Stephen B., and Orville R. Butler.  1999.  Manufacturing the Future:  A History 
of Western Electric.  New York:  Cambridge University Press. 
Arora, Ashish, Marco Ceccagnoli, and Wesley M. Cohen.  2007. “Trading Knowledge: 
An Exploration of Patent Protection and Other Determinants of Market 
Transactions in Technology and R&D.” In Financing Innovation in the United 
States, 1870 to the Present, eds. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 
365-403.  Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT Press. 
Arora, Ashish, Andrea Fosfuri, and Alfonso Gambardella.  2001.  Markets for 
Technology:  The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy.  Cambridge, 
Mass.:  MIT Press. 
Arrow, Kenneth J.  1962. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention.”  In The Rate and Direction of Economic Activity:  Economic and 
Social Factors, Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, 
609-26.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press. 
Averitt, Robert T.  1968.  The Dual Economy:  The Dynamics of American Industry 
Structure.  New York:  W. W. Norton. 
Baskin, Jonathan Barron, and Paul J. Miranti, Jr.  1997.  A History of Corporate Finance.  
New York:  Cambridge University Press. 36 
 
Bernstein, Michael A. 1987.  The Great Depression:  Delayed Recovery and Economic 
Change in America, 1929-1939.  New York:  Cambridge University Press. 
Blum, John Morton.  1976.  V Was for Victory:  Politics and Culture during World War 
II (San Diego, Cal.:  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Bulletin of the National Research Council.  1921. Pt. 1,  No. 16 (December). 
Bulleting of the National Research Council.  1927.  No. 60 (July). 
Bulletin of the National Research Council.  1946.  No. 113 (July). 
Calomiris, Charles W.  1995.  “The Costs of Rejecting University Banking:  American 
Finance in the German Mirror, 1870-1914.” In Coordination and Information:  
Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise, eds. Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux and Daniel M. G. Raff, 257-315.  Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press. 
Carosso, Vincent P.  1970.  Investment Banking in America: A History.  Cambridge, 
Mass.:  Harvard University Press. 
Carosso, Vincent P.  1987.  The Morgans:  Private International Bankers, 1854-1913.  
Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press. 
Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. 1977.  The Visible Hand:  The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business.  Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press. 
Cohen, Wesley M., and Steven Klepper. 1996. “A Reprise of Size and R&D.”  Economic 
Journal 106 (July): 925-51. 
Cohen, Wesley M., Richard C. Levin, and David C. Mowery.  1987.  “Firm Size and 
R&D Intensity:  A Re-examination.”  Journal of Industrial Economics 35 (June): 
543-65. 37 
 
Cohen, Wesley M., Richard Nelson, and John P. Walsh.  2000.  “Protecting their 
Intellectual Assets:  Appropriability Condititions and Why U.S. Manufacturing 
Firms Patent (or Not).” NBER Working Paper 7552.  
Commercial and Financial Chronicle. 1870-72 and 1890-91.  New York:  William P. 
Dana & Co. 
Cull, Robert, Lance E. Davis, Naomi R. Lamoreaux, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. 2006. 
“Historical Financing of Small- and Medium-Size Enterprises.” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 30 (November): 3017-42. 
De Long, J. Bradford. 1991.  “Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Value? An Economist’s 
Perspective on Financial Capitalism.”  In Inside the Business Enterprise:  
Historical Perspectives on the Use of Information, ed. Peter Temin, 205-36. 
Chicago:  University of Chicago Press. 
Edwards, Richard C. 1975.  “Stages in Corporate Stability and the Risks of Corporate 
Failure.”  Journal of Economic History 35 (June): 428-57. 
Federer, J. Peter.  2008.  “Advances in Communication Technology and Growth of the 
American Over-the-Counter Markets, 1876-1929.” Journal of Economic History 
68 (June):  501-34. 
Fisk, Catherine L.  1998. “Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’:  
Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930.” University of Chicago Law Review 65 
(Fall): 1127-98. 
Fisk, Catherine L. 2001. “Working Knowledge:  Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in 
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920.”  Hastings 
Law Journal 52 (January): 441-535. 38 
 
Gans, Joshua, and Scott Stern.  2003.  “The Product Market and the Market for ‘Ideas’:  
Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs.” Research Policy 32 
(February): 333-50. 
Gibb, George Sweet, and Evelyn H. Knowlton.  1956.  History of Standard Oil Company 
(New Jersey), Vol. 2, The Resurgent Years, 1911-1927.  New York:  Harper & 
Brothers. 
Hall, Brownwyn H. 2006.  “2002 Updates to NBER Patent Data.” 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/bhdata.html (accessed October 2008). 
Hall, Brownwyn H., Adam B. Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg.  2002.  “The NBER Patent-
Citation Data File:  Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools.” In Patents, 
Citations, and Innovations: A Window on the Knowledge Economy, eds. Adam B. 
Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg, 403-459. Cambridge, Mass:  MIT Press. 
Hintz, Eric S.  2007.  “Independent Researchers in an Era of Burgeoning Research & 
Development.” Business and Economic History On-Line 5, http://www.h-
net.org/~business/bhcweb/publications/BEHonline/2007/hintz.pdf. 
Hounshell, David A., and John Kenley Smith, Jr. 1988.  Science and Corporate Strategy: 
Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980.  New York:  Cambridge University Press. 
Hughes, Thomas Parke.  1989.  American Genesis:  A Century of Invention and 
Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970.  New York:  Viking. 
Jewkes, John, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman.  1958.  The Sources of Invention.  
London:  Macmillan. 39 
 
Klepper, Steven.  2007.  “The Organizing and Financing of Innovative Companies in the 
Evolution of the U.S. Automobile Industry.”  In Financing Innovation in the 
United States, eds. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 85-128. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Margaret Levenstein.  2008.  “The Decline of an Innovative 
Region:  Cleveland, Ohio, in the Twentieth Century.” Unpublished paper. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., Margaret Levenstein, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff.  2006.  
“Mobilizing Venture Capital During the Second Industrial Revolution: Cleveland, 
Ohio, 1870-1920.” Capitalism and Society 1, 
http://www.bepress.com/cas/vol1/iss3/art5/. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., Margaret Levenstein, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff.  2007.  
“Financing Invention during the Second Industrial Revolution:  Cleveland, Ohio, 
1870-1920.” In Financing Innovation in the United States, eds. Lamoreaux and 
Sokoloff, 39-84.   
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 1996.  “Long-Term Change in the 
Organization of Inventive Activity.” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 93 (12 November): 12686-92. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff.  1999. “Inventors, Firms, and the 
Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.”  
In Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms and Countries, eds. Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, 19-57. Chicago:  University of 
Chicago Press. 40 
 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2001. “Market Trade in Patents and the 
Rise of a Class of Specialized Inventors in the Nineteenth-Century United States.” 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 91 (May): 39-44. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2003. “Intermediaries in the U.S. 
Market for Technology, 1870-1920.”  In Finance, Intermediaries, and Economic 
Development, eds. Stanley L. Engerman, Philip T. Hoffman, Jean-Laurent 
Rosenthal, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff,  209-46. New York:  Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff.  2007. “The Market for Technology and 
the Organization of Invention in U.S. History.”  In Entrepreneurship, Innovation, 
and the Growth Mechanism of the Free-Enterprise Economies, eds. Eytan 
Sheshinski, Robert J. Strom, and William J. Baumol, 213-43. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff.  2009.  “The Rise and Decline of the 
Independent Inventor:  A Schumpeterian Story?”  In The Challenge of Remaining 
Innovative: Insights from Twentieth Century American Business, eds. Sally H. 
Clarke, Naomi R. Lamoreaux, and Steven W. Usselman, 43-78.  Stanford:  
Stanford University Press. 
Lanjouw, Jean O., and Mark Schankerman.  2004.  “Patent Quality and Research 
Productivity;  Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators.”  Economic 
Journal 114 (April):  441-65. 
Lazonick, William.  1991.  Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy.  
New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1991. 41 
 
Lerner, Josh.  1994.  “The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis.”  Rand 
Journal of Economics 25 (Summer): 319-33. 
Lerner, Josh.  1995.  “Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors.”  Journal of Law and 
Economics 38 (October): 463-95. 
Leslie, Stuart W.  1980.  “Thomas Midgley and the Politics of Industrial Research.”  
Business History Review 54 (Winter): 480-503. 
Lipartito, Kenneth.  2009.  “Rethinking the Invention Factory:  Bell Laboratories in 
Perspective.” In The Challenge of Remaining Innovative, eds. Clarke, Lamoreaux, 
and Usselman, 132-59. 
Martin, Joseph G.  1898.  A Century of Finance:  Martin’s History of the Boston Stock 
and Money Markets.  Boston:  privately printed. 
Moody’s Manual of Investments and Security Rating Service.  1924, 1929, and 1935.  
New York:  Moody’s Investors Service. 
Mowery, David C.  1983. “The Relationship between Intrafirm and Contractual Forms of 
Industrial Research in American Manufacturing, 1900-1940.”  Explorations in 
Economic History 20 (October):  351-74. 
Mowery, David C. 1995.  “The Boundaries of the U.S. Firm in R&D.” In Coordination 
and Information, eds. Lamoreaux and Raff, 147-76. 
Mowery, David C., and Nathan Rosenberg.  1989.  Technology and the Pursuit of 
Economic Growth.  New York:  Cambridge University Press. 
Navin, Thomas R., and Marian V. Sears.  1955.  “The Rise of a Market for Industrial 
Securities, 1887-1902.”  Business History Review 29 (June): 105-38. 42 
 
Neal, Larry, and Lance E. Davis.  2007.  “Why Did Finance Capitalism and the Second 
Industrial Revolution Arise in the 1890s?” In Financing Innovation in the United 
States, eds. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 129-61.  
Nelson, Richard R..  1959.  “The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research.” 
Journal of Political Economy 67 (June): 297-306. 
Nicholas, Tom. 2003. “Why Schumpeter Was Right:  Innovation, Market Power, and 
Creative Destruction in 1920s America.” Journal of Economic History 63 
(December): 1023-58. 
Nicholas, Tom.  2007.  “Stock Market Swings and the Value of Innovation, 1908-1929.”   
In Financing Innovation in the United States, eds. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 217-
245.  
Nicholas, Tom.  2008.  “Does Innovation Cause Stock Market Runups?  Evidence from 
the Great Crash.”  American Economic Review 98 (Sept. 2008): 1370-96. 
Nicholas, Tom.  2009.  “Spatial Diversity in Invention:  Evidence from the Early R&D 
Labs.”  Journal of Economic Geography 9 (January): 1-31. 
O’Sullivan, Mary A.  2007.  “Funding New Industries:  A Historical Perspective on the 
Financing Role of the U.S. Stock Market in the Twentieth Century.”  In 
Financing Innovation in the United States, eds. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 163-
216.   
Poor’s Manual of Industrials. 1910 and 1912. New York:  Poor’s Railroad Manual Co. 
Reich, Leonard S. 1977. “Research, Patents, and the Struggle to Control Radio:  A Study 
of Big Business and the Uses of Industrial Research.” Business History Review 51 
(Summer):  208-35. 43 
 
Reich, Leonard S. 1980. “Industrial Research and the Pursuit of Corporate Security:  The 
Early Years of Bell Labs.” Business History Review 54 (Winter): 504-29. 
Reich, Leonard S. 1985. The Making of American Industrial Research:  Science and 
Business at GE and Bell, 1876-1926. New York:  Cambridge University Press. 
Ripley, William Z. 1927.  Main Street and Wall Street.  Boston:  Little, Brown & Co. 
Robb, John F.  1922.  Patent Essentials for the Executive, Engineer, Lawyer and 
Inventor.  New York:  Funk & Wagnalls. 
Robinson, William G.  1890.  The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions.  Boston:  Little, 
Brown & Company.  3 vols. 
Rosenbloom, Richard S., and William J. Spencer.  1996.  “Introduction:  Technology’s 
Vanishing Wellspring.”  In Engines of Innovation:  U.S. Industrial Research at 
the End of an Era, eds. Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1-9.  Boston:  Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Scherer, F. M.  1965.  “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of 
Patented Inventions.”  American Economic Review 55 (December):  1097-1125. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A.  1942.  Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.  New York:  
Harper. 
Simon, Miguel Cantillo. 1998. “The Rise And Fall of Bank Control in the United States: 
1890-1939.” American Economic Review 88 (December): 1077-93 
Smith, John K., and David A. Hounshell.  1985.  “Wallace H. Carothers and Fundamental 
Research at Du Pont.”  Science 229 (Aug. 2): 436-42. 44 
 
Teece, David J. 1986.  “Profiting from Technological Innovation:  Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing, and Public Policy.” Research Policy 15 
(December): 285-305. 
Teece, David J.  1988. “Technological Change and the Nature of the Firm.”  In Technical 
Change and Economic Theory, eds. Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman, 
Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg, and Luc Soete, 256-81. London:  Pinter. 
Teece, David J.  1993.  “The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism:  Perspectives on Alfred 
Chandler’s Scale and Scope.” Journal of Economic Literature 31 (March): 199-
225. 
U.S. Census Bureau.  2002.  “Demographic Trends in the 20
th Century.” Census 2000 
Special Reports, Series CENSR-4. http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-
4.pdf. 
U.S. Commissioner of Patents.  1870-71, 1890-91, 1900-25, 1946, 1955.  Annual Report.  
Washington:  Government Printing Office. 
Usselman, Steven W.  2002.  Regulating Railroad Innovation:  Business, Technology, 
and Politics in America, 1840-1920. New York:  Cambridge University Press. 
Usselman, Steven W.  2007.  “Learning the Hard Way: IBM and the Sources of 
Innovation in Early Computing,” in Financing Innovation in the United States, 
eds. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 317-63.  
Vatter, Harold G.  1985.  The U.S. Economy in World War II.  New York:  Columbia 
University Press. 45 
 
White, Eugene N.  1984.  “Banking Innovation in the 1920s:  The Growth of National 
Banks’ Financial Services.” Business and Economic History, Second Series 13: 
92-104. 
White, Eugene N.  1990.  “The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited.”  
Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (Spring): 67-83. 
White, Eugene N.  2009.  “Competition Among the Exchanges Before the SEC:  Was the 
NYSE a Natural Hegemon?”  Unpublished paper. 
White, Richard.  2003.  “Information, Markets, and Corruption:  Transcontinental 
Railroads in the Gilded Age.”  Journal of American History 90 (June): 19-43. 
Wise, George.  1985.  Willis R. Whitney, General Electric, and the Origins of U.S. 
Industrial Research.  New York:  Columbia University Press. 
Zeckhauser, Richard.  1996.  “The Challenge of Contracting for Technological 
Information.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 93 (12 November): 12743-48. 46 
 
Table 1:  Distribution of Patents and Assignments at Issue by Type of Company 
1870-71 1,425 83.9 13.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.6
1890-91 2,022 70.8 15.7 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 13.0
1910-11 2,498 69.2 11.0 1.2 2.2 0.2 2.6 13.5
1928-29 2,297 43.9 7.2 16.1 4.4 2.0 4.4 22.1
1870-71 38 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 97.4
1890-91 273 0.4 2.9 0.0 0.4 96.3
1910-11 494 6.3 11.3 0.8 13.2 68.4
1928-29 1,124 32.8 8.9 4.1 9.1 45.1
1870-71 35 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 97.1
1890-91 220 0.5 1.4 0.0 0.5 97.7
1910-11 372 3.2 5.6 0.8 11.6 78.8
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Sources and Notes: The observations in Panels A and B are random samples of patents 
taken from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Patents for the years 1870-71, 
1890-91, 1910-11, and 1928-29.  We report only utility patents awarded to residents of 
the United States, excluding patents assigned to foreign companies and patents that were 
reissued.  “Not assigned” means that the patent was not sold or otherwise transferred by 
the time it was issued. We break assignments at issue into categories according to the 
identity of the assignee:  first, whether the assignee was an individual or a company; and 
second, if it was a company, whether it was the subject of a report in a financial 
publication (the Commercial and Financial Chronicle for the 1870-71 and 1890-91 cross 
sections; Poor’s Manual of Industrials for 1910-11; and Moody’s Manual for 1928-29). 
We divided companies for which financial reports existed into two classes according to 
the amount of assets on their balance sheets.  If no information on assets was reported for 
a firm, we used its total capitalization instead.  If the firm was part of a larger company, 
wherever possible we used the data for the parent on the grounds that that information 
better reflected the financial resources available to the enterprise.  Information on 
whether a company had a research lab came from the surveys published in the Bulletin of 
the National Research Council for 1921, 1927, and 1946. We considered the firm to have 
a research lab if it was listed as having one in a survey conducted before the year of the 
cross-sectional sample or if the 1946 survey, which included historical information, listed 
a founding date for the lab that was before the year of the cross section.  A few firms in 
the category “other company” had industrial research labs, though to save space, we do 
not provide the breakdown in this table.  The observations in Panel C are the companies 47 
 
to which the patents in the respective cross-sectional samples were assigned.  In a few 




Table 2:  Characteristics of Patents by Type of Assignee 
1910-11 0.04 n.a. n.a. 0.06 0.02 0.50 0.22 0.26
1928-29 0.09 n.a. n.a. 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.31 0.26
1910-11 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.25 0.11 0.18
1928-29 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.32
1910-11 0.32 0.29 0.36 0.39 0.77 0.25 0.38 0.34
1928-29 0.50 0.37 0.58 0.78 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.52
1910-11 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.52 0.00 0.14 0.19
1928-29 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.46 0.15 0.37 0.20 0.21
1910-11 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.50 0.06 0.08
1928-29 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10
Panel B:  Proportion cited by a patent obtained in 1975-2002
Panel C:  Proportion high-tech1
Panel D:  Proportion high-tech2










Had      
R&D     
lab
Assigned to company with a financial report
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Sources and Notes:  For a description of the cross-sectional samples of patents and the 
categories of assignees, see Table 1.  We considered the patentee to be a principal if the 
company obtaining the assignment bore the surname of the inventor or if information in a 
financial publication or city directory revealed that the patentee was an officer, director, 
or proprietor of the company.  Data on citations from 1975-2002 come from Bronwyn H. 
Hall, “2002 Updates to NBER Patent Data,” http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/bhdata.html, 
last updated 5 Sept 2006. See Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002) for further information.  
We classified patents in the 1910-11 and 1928-29 samples by technology in two different 
ways.  For high-tech1, we categorized a patent as high tech if, based on our reading of the 
patent, it pertained to electrical machinery and products, chemicals, petroleum, plastics 
and rubber, automobiles, primary metals, mining machinery, and transportation 
equipment, as well as the machinery used in production in these industries.  For high-
tech2, we defined as high-tech patents that were classified by Hall et al. (2002) as falling 
in technology subclasses 11-49 (based on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s 
classification scheme). These subclasses include patents in chemicals, computers and 
communication technology, drugs and medical devices, and electrical and electronics. 
We consider a patent to have been collaborative if it the number of patentees on the grant 
was greater than one. 49 
 
Table 3:  Distribution of Patents and Patent Claims by Type of Assignee (Row 
Percentages) 
1910-11 n.a. n.a. 1.9 0.9 1.9 13.2 82.1
1928-29 n.a. n.a. 7.1 5.6 4.6 16.3 66.3
1910-11 76.9 8.9 0.2 1.8 0.2 1.2 10.8
1928-29 48.3 7.7 12.2 4.1 1.9 4.0 21.8
1910-11 62.9 12.4 1.5 5.4 0.1 3.2 14.4
1928-29 32.4 8.3 24.8 4.6 2.3 4.9 22.7
1910-11 60.2 11.9 1.6 7.5 0.0 2.3 16.5
1928-29 33.5 7.1 30.7 2.7 3.1 3.6 19.3
1910-11 59.1 11.7 3.6 4.6 0.2 3.2 17.6
1928-29 34.7 7.4 19.5 7.1 2.3 5.2 23.8
No    
R&D     
lab
Had      
R&D     
lab
No    







Panel B:  Distribution of patents cited by a patent obtained in 1975-2002
Had      
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Panel C:  Distribution of patents classified as high-tech1
Panel D:  Distribution of patents classified as high-tech 2
Panel E:  Distribution of patent claims
Assigned to company with a financial report
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Notes and Sources:  See Tables 1 and 2.  We do not report the distribution for 
collaborative patents because the number of patents that named more than one inventor 
was so small.  Patent claims are the number of individual claims for novel technological 
contributions that the Patent Office approved in the text of the patent. 50 
 
Table 4:  Regional Shares of Patents by Assignee Type (Column Percentages) 
Panel A: 1910-11
West 10.6 12.3 11.6 1.1 0.0 5.9 8.5 4.8 12.3 10.5 9.0 8.9
West North Central 11.2 13.6 8.7 4.6 5.8 4.1 5.7 4.8 9.4 11.0 8.3 9.1
East North Central 26.1 25.9 23.9 14.9 23.2 32.5 40.6 15.6 27.9 27.1 23.5 26.4
New England 9.7 7.6 11.2 2.3 33.3 16.3 19.8 19.9 9.1 8.0 11.9 11.1
Middle Atlantic 29.8 26.2 28.3 75.9 36.2 36.1 18.9 51.6 29.5 32.8 37.7 34.8
S o u t h  A t l a n t i c 2 . 12 . 04 . 01 . 10 . 02 . 10 . 92 . 22 . 12 . 51 . 82 . 1
Other South 10.4 12.4 12.3 0.0 1.4 3.0 5.7 1.1 9.8 8.1 7.8 7.7
Panel B:  1928-29
West 10.4 16.4 15.8 1.7 2.7 6.9 5.1 8.2 11.6 7.5 10.0 8.1
West North Central 6.9 9.6 12.1 1.9 4.1 5.3 6.1 3.1 7.4 6.3 3.8 5.4
East North Central 30.1 26.4 20.0 29.0 44.6 37.5 43.9 32.8 29.3 32.0 27.3 30.5
New England 10.0 6.6 9.1 11.5 20.3 12.4 14.8 10.9 9.4 6.9 8.7 12.2
Middle Atlantic 33.7 28.6 27.3 53.5 25.7 29.8 23.5 35.5 33.3 38.0 42.0 37.2
S o u t h  A t l a n t i c 2 . 41 . 54 . 81 . 72 . 04 . 33 . 66 . 31 . 92 . 93 . 32 . 3
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Notes and Sources:  See Tables 1 and 2. Regions are the locations of the assignees. The West includes Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming; the West North Central Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota; the East North Central Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin; New 
England Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont; the Middle Atlantic New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania; the South Atlantic Delaware, the District of Columbia, and Maryland; the Other South Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West 
Virginia.  52 
 
Table 5:  Distribution of Patents within Regions by Assignment Categories and by Patent Characteristics 
Had No Had No
R&D R&D R&D R&D
lab lab lab lab
Panel A:  1910-11
West 266 80.1 12.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 7.5 25.9 31.2 13.2 42.9 42.9
West North Central 281 83.6 8.5 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 5.0 18.9 31.0 11.4 27.3 40.9
East North Central 652 68.6 10.1 0.8 1.2 0.0 2.5 16.9 24.1 32.8 14.0 30.9 20.9
New England 242 54.1 12.8 0.4 0.4 1.2 8.3 22.7 21.1 26.0 19.0 26.3 46.3
Middle Atlantic 744 60.9 10.5 3.2 5.6 0.1 3.2 16.4 22.3 34.8 19.6 9.4 45.1
South Atlantic 53 64.2 20.8 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.2 22.6 37.7 13.2 12.5 50.0
Other South 260 82.7 13.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.8 21.2 24.6 11.5 54.5 18.2
Panel B:  1928-29
West 238 69.3 10.9 1.7 1.7 0.4 1.3 14.7 36.6 36.6 23.1 21.3 44.7
West North Central 159 61.0 12.6 2.5 3.1 1.9 1.9 17.0 35.2 45.9 13.2 28.6 19.0
East North Central 691 38.5 4.8 14.9 4.8 2.5 7.1 27.5 32.0 53.4 21.7 21.9 21.4
New England 229 29.3 6.6 16.6 7.0 3.9 9.2 27.5 31.0 34.9 21.0 19.7 19.0
Middle Atlantic 773 37.3 5.8 27.2 5.3 1.8 3.1 19.5 32.5 56.7 29.9 10.5 20.7
South Atlantic 56 26.8 14.3 14.3 0.0 1.8 3.6 39.3 25.0 58.9 32.1 21.2 48.5
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Notes and Sources:  See Tables 1, 2, and 4. 53 
 
Table 6:  Regional Distribution of Assignee Companies by Type  
West 20 3.1 0.0 6.5 5.0 0.0 95.0
West North Central 17 3.1 8.5 4.1 5.9 23.5 70.6
East North Central 116 18.8 29.8 32.8 5.2 12.1 82.8
New England 63 6.3 25.5 16.7 3.2 19.0 77.8
Middle Atlantic 138 65.6 34.0 34.5 15.2 11.6 73.2
South Atlantic 7 3.1 0.0 2.0 14.3 0.0 85.7
Other South 11 0.0 2.1 3.4 0.0 9.1 90.9
West 43 2.7 3.1 7.2 11.6 9.3 79.1
West North Central 38 3.8 4.7 5.3 18.4 15.8 65.8
East North Central 288 32.1 43.8 36.4 20.5 19.4 60.1
New England 107 12.5 18.8 12.6 21.5 22.4 56.1
Middle Atlantic 262 45.7 26.6 30.3 32.1 13.0 55.0
South Atlantic 26 1.6 2.3 4.2 11.5 11.5 76.9
Other South 23 1.6 0.8 4.0 13.0 4.3 82.6
Panel A:  1910-11






Assets    
< $10 
million
Column Percentages Row Percentages
Company had a 
Financial Report













Notes and Sources:  See Tables 1, 2, and 4. We assigned companies that had facilities in 
different states to a region on the basis of the location recorded on the earliest patent they 
received in the sample years. 54 
 
Table 7:  Whose Patents were Important? 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
High-tech patent -0.001 0.006 -0.036 -0.035 -0.059 -0.058 -0.093 -0.098
(0.05) (0.19) (1.15) (1.12) (1.24) (1.21) (1.76)* (1.85)*
Large national firm -0.042 -0.040 -0.041 -0.038 0.277 0.239 0.272 0.235
(1.08) (1.00) (1.06) (0.97) (4.32)*** (3.69)*** (4.27)*** (3.63)***
Small national firm -0.020 -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 0.087 0.066 0.086 0.067
(0.47) (0.52) (0.47) (0.50) (1.18) (0.89) (1.17) (0.90)
Had R&D lab -0.023 -0.020 -0.016 -0.012 -0.104 -0.101 -0.086 -0.082
(0.63) (0.54) (0.42) (0.32) (1.72)* (1.69)* (1.41) (1.35)
Patentee was principal 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.055 0.064 0.053 0.062
(0.32) (0.26) (0.28) (0.24) (0.86) (1.00) (0.82) (0.96)
West 0.072 0.074 -0.160 -0.126
(0.99) (1.03) (1.31) (1.04)
West North Central -0.003 -0.009 -0.305 -0.317
(0.04) (0.12) (2.35)** (2.45)**
East North Central 0.028 0.024 -0.072 -0.075
(0.85) (0.73) (1.31) (1.36)
New England 0.044 0.038 0.050 0.053
(0.96) (0.84) (0.67) (0.72)
South Atlantic 0.019 0.017 -0.012 -0.012
(0.23) (0.21) (0.08) (0.08)
Other South 0.013 0.005 -0.457 -0.462
(0.13) (0.05) (2.61)*** (2.64)***
Constant 2.051 2.108 2.037 2.095
(43.66)*** (35.83)*** (50.26)*** (39.71)***
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124
Patent was cited in 1975-2002 Number of claims
Using high-tech1 Using high-tech2 Using high-tech1 Using high-tech2
 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Notes and Sources:  The absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. Columns 1 
through 4 are probits, and the reported figures are the marginal effects.  Columns 5 
through 8 are negative binomial regressions.  Observations are patents in the 1928-29 
cross section that were assigned to companies. For definitions of the other variables, see 
Tables 1, 2, and 4.   55 
 
Table 8:  Whose Patents Were High-Tech?  Collaborative? 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
High-tech patent -0.005 -0.007 -0.023 -0.026
(0.22) (0.35) (1.09) (1.19)
Large national firm 0.113 0.100 0.003 -0.008 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021
(2.72)*** (2.36)** (0.09) (0.21) (0.73) (0.74) (0.75) (0.74)
Small national firm 0.006 0.018 -0.012 0.002 0.009 0.014 0.009 0.014
(0.13) (0.38) (0.26) (0.05) (0.28) (0.44) (0.28) (0.46)
Had R&D lab 0.135 0.119 0.238 0.234 0.017 0.014 0.021 0.019
(3.41)*** (2.98)*** (6.23)*** (6.06)*** (0.63) (0.54) (0.79) (0.70)
Patentee was principal -0.018 -0.012 -0.057 -0.045 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.028
(0.45) (0.29) (1.49) (1.14) (1.04) (1.06) (1.00) (1.04)
West -0.278 0.104 -0.011 -0.007
(3.54)*** (1.43) (0.23) (0.14)
West North Central -0.054 -0.172 -0.028 -0.032
(0.68) (2.42)** (0.55) (0.64)
East North Central -0.067 -0.095 -0.017 -0.019
(1.87)* (3.05)*** (0.76) (0.86)
New England -0.290 -0.113 -0.028 -0.029
(5.97)*** (2.74)*** (0.95) (1.01)
South Atlantic -0.126 -0.035 -0.002 -0.001
(1.38) (0.43) (0.03) (0.01)
Other South -0.165 -0.208 0.053 0.048
(1.54) (2.24)** (0.75) (0.68)
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,124
Patent was high-tech Patent was collaborative
Using high-tech1 Using high-tech2 Using high-tech1 Using high-tech2
 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Notes and Sources:  The absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. The estimates 
are probits, and the reported figures are marginal effects.  Observations are patents in the 
1928-29 cross section that were assigned to companies. For definitions of the variables, 
see Tables 1, 2, and 4. 
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Table 9:  Distribution of Patents by Companies’ Access to Equity Markets in 1929 
  Exchanges where the firm’s 
  equities traded in 1929
NYSE and regional exchanges 201 98.5 1.0 92.5 3.5 96.5 22.4 89.1 60.7
  NYSE only 137 94.9 5.1 65.7 5.1 94.9 31.4 69.3 24.1
Secondary NY and regional  63 79.4 20.6 63.5 11.1 88.9 15.9 52.4 17.5
Secondary NY exchanges only 58 60.3 39.7 55.2 12.1 87.9 37.9 56.9 34.5
Regional exchanges only 41 31.7 68.3 46.3 24.4 75.6 29.3 70.7 22.0
Unknown 121 35.5 62.0 40.5 23.1 76.9 31.4 45.5 22.3
All Assignees found in Moody’s 621 75.5 23.8 67.0 10.6 89.4 27.4 68.3 35.7
Assignees not found in Moody’s 503 n.a. n.a. 8.5 25.8 74.2 32.0 51.5 20.9
NYSE and regional exchanges 17.9 42.2 1.4 40.5 3.6 20.9 13.6 26.2 37.3
  NYSE only 12.2 27.7 4.7 19.6 3.6 14.0 13.0 13.9 10.1
Secondary NY and regional  5.6 10.7 8.8 8.7 3.6 6.0 3.0 4.8 3.4
Secondary NY exchanges only 5.2 7.5 15.5 7.0 3.6 5.5 6.6 4.8 6.1
Regional exchanges only 3.6 2.8 18.9 4.1 5.1 3.3 3.6 4.2 2.8
Unknown 10.8 9.2 50.7 10.7 14.3 10.0 11.5 8.1 8.3
All assignees found in Moody’s 55.2 100.0 100.0 90.6 33.7 59.8 51.4 62.1 67.9
Assignees not found in Moody’s 44.8 0.0 0.0 9.4 66.3 40.2 48.6 37.9 32.1
Patents    
that were   
cited in 
1995-2002
Panel A:  Row percentages of patents

















Patents    
that were   
high-tech1
Patents    




















Notes and Sources:  The table includes patents in the 1928-29 cross section that were assigned to companies.  Information on the 
markets where the securities of the assignee companies traded comes from Moody’s Manual of Investments for 1929.  The category 
“unknown” includes companies which were covered by Moody’s but for which the report did not include information on where the 
equities traded.  The stock of these companies was probably either closely held or traded privately.  If the assignee was a subsidiary of 
a larger company, wherever possible we reported the information for the parent company.  The variable “patents assigned to firms 
with inventor principals” includes firms that bore the patentees’ surnames, as well as firms for which we know the patentee was an 
officer, director, or proprietor.  All remaining firms are included in “patents assigned to firms without inventor principals.”  For 
definitions of the other variables, see Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 10:  Companies’ Access to Equity Markets in 1929 
Exchanges where the firm’s 
equities traded in 1929
NYSE and regional exchanges 45 93.3 4.4 73.3 6.7 93.3
  NYSE only 75 93.3 6.7 49.3 8.0 92.0
Secondary NY and regional  29 65.5 34.5 58.6 13.8 86.2
Secondary NY exchanges only 42 54.8 45.2 59.5 9.5 90.5
Regional exchanges only 32 21.9 78.1 37.5 28.1 71.9
Unknown 93 24.7 72.0 32.3 25.8 74.2
All Assignees found in Moody’s 316 58.2 40.5 48.7 15.8 84.2
Assignees not found in Moody’s 471 n.a. n.a. 7.4 27.2 72.8
NYSE and regional exchanges 5.7 22.8 1.6 17.5 1.7 6.9
  NYSE only 9.5 38.0 3.9 19.6 3.4 11.3
Secondary NY and regional  3.7 10.3 7.8 9.0 2.2 4.1
Secondary NY exchanges only 5.3 12.5 14.8 13.2 2.2 6.3
Regional exchanges only 4.1 3.8 19.5 6.3 5.1 3.8
Unknown 11.8 12.5 52.3 15.9 13.5 11.3
All Assignees found in Moody’s 40.2 100.0 100.0 81.5 28.1 43.8
Assignees not found in Moody’s 59.8 n.a. n.a. 18.5 71.9 56.3
Assignee 
firms with 














Panel A:  Row percentages of firms









Notes and Sources:  See Tables 1, 2, and 9. 59 
 
Table 11:  Earlier Trading Histories of Assignee Companies Found in Moody’s in 1929 
1924 1912 1924 1912 1924 1912 1924 1912 1924 1912 1924 1912 1924 1912
NYSE and regional exchanges 55.6 15.6 2.2 2.2 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 15.6 6.7 17.8 22.2 48.9
  NYSE only 4.0 4.0 37.3 12.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.0 2.7 2.7 20.0 21.3 29.3 56.0
Secondary NY and regional exchanges 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 0.0 6.9 0.0 31.0 17.2 27.6 37.9 17.2 44.8
Secondary NY exchanges only 4.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.4 0.0 23.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 42.9 38.1 26.2 57.1
Regional exchanges only 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.3 9.4 25.0 21.9 43.8 68.8
Unknown 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.2 57.0 19.4 40.9 77.4
All categories of equities 10.1 3.2 9.2 3.5 2.2 0.0 5.4 0.9 8.2 6.6 33.2 24.1 31.6 61.7
NYSE and regional exchanges 78.1 70.0 3.4 9.1 42.9 n.a. 0.0 0.0 11.5 33.3 2.9 10.5 10.0 11.3
  NYSE only 9.4 30.0 96.6 81.8 0.0 n.a. 29.4 100.0 7.7 9.5 14.3 21.1 22.0 21.5
Secondary NY and regional exchanges 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.9 n.a. 11.8 0.0 34.6 23.8 7.6 14.5 5.0 6.7
Secondary NY exchanges only 6.3 0.0 0.0 9.1 14.3 n.a. 58.8 0.0 0.0 4.8 17.1 21.1 11.0 12.3
Regional exchanges only 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0 0.0 38.5 14.3 7.6 9.2 14.0 11.3
Unknown 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0 0.0 7.7 14.3 50.5 23.7 38.0 36.9
All categories of equities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n.a. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel A:  Row percentages of firms



















Notes and Sources:  The table includes firms assigned patents in the 1928-29 for which there were reports in Moody’s for 1929.  
Trading information comes from Moody’s Manual of Investments for 1924 and 1929 and Poor’s Manual of Industrials for 1912.60 
 
Table 12: Effects of the Great Depression by Type of Firm and Region 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High-tech patent 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.031 -0.103 -0.089 -0.029 -0.017
(0.66) (0.74) (0.79) (0.96) (2.76)*** (2.37)** (0.77) (0.44)
Large firm -0.185 -0.177 -0.184 -0.175 -0.220 -0.205 -0.228 -0.210
(4.79)*** (4.63)*** (4.78)*** (4.61)*** (4.85)*** (4.53)*** (4.99)*** (4.60)***
Had R&D lab -0.210 -0.200 -0.215 -0.205 -0.154 -0.142 -0.162 -0.150
(5.88)*** (5.66)*** (5.85)*** (5.66)*** (3.81)*** (3.52)*** (3.91)*** (3.61)***
Patentee was principal 0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.078 0.062 0.075 0.064
(0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.14) (1.39) (1.12) (1.35) (1.14)
West 0.233 0.221 0.192 0.205
(1.97)** (1.91)* (1.45) (1.51)
West North Central 0.366 0.365 0.431 0.454
(3.07)*** (3.07)*** 3.25)*** (3.38)***
East North Central 0.065 0.067 0.085 0.083
(1.90)* (1.96)* 2.04)** (1.99)**
New England -0.012 -0.014 0.081 0.105
(0.28) (0.34) (1.45) (1.87)*
South Atlantic 0.071 0.061 -0.013 -0.011
(0.58) (0.50) (0.09) (0.07)
Other South 0.464 0.463 0.362 0.381
(2.00)** (2.01)** (1.48) (1.54)
Observations 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621
Bankrupt, in reorganization, dropped from 
Moody’s, or access to financial markets 
deteriorated
Using high-tech1 Using high-tech2 Using high-tech1 Using high-tech2
Bankrupt, in reorganization, or dropped from 
Moody’s
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Notes and Sources:  The absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. The estimates 
are probits, and the reported figures are the marginal effects. The observations are patents 
in the 1928-29 cross section that were assigned to companies for which there were reports 
in Moody’s for 1929. Because our observations are patents, the estimations are effectively 
weighted by the number of patents each company was assigned.  In the first four 
columns, the dependent variable is a dummy which takes a value of one if Moody’s no 
longer published a report on the firm obtaining the patent or if the report indicated that 
the firm was in bankruptcy or being reorganized. Seventeen percent of patents were 
assigned to firms classified as distressed by this definition.  In the second four columns, 
the dependent variable is a dummy that aims to capture deterioration in an assignee’s 
access to financial markets using the following coding scheme:  Firms that were listed on 
the NYSE were coded 5; those listed on both a regional market and a secondary New 
York market, 4; those listed on either a regional market or a secondary New York market 
but not both, 3; those for which no listing information was given, 2; and those without 
any report in Moody’s, 1.  The dependent variable obtained a value of 1 if the firm 
obtaining the patent had a numerical code that was lower in 1935 than in 1929 or if the 
firm was in bankruptcy or reorganization, and a 0 in all other cases. Twenty-four percent 
of patents were assigned to firms classified as distressed by this second definition. For 
definitions of the independent variables, see Tables 1, 2, 4, and 8. 61
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South Atlantic and South
Notes and Sources: Patent rates are number of patents per million residents of the region. Patent counts come from U.S.
Commissioner of Patents, Annual Reports, 1900-1925, 1946, and 1955. Population figures are from U.S. Census Bureau,
“Demographic Trends in the 20th Century,” Census 2000 Special Reports, Series CENSR-4,
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf (released 2002).